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O

ver the past few decades, nuclear
weapons have been regarded as an
intolerable threat to international
security and humanity. A nuclear weapons
attack has the ability to destroy entire cities and
kill billions of people, while also harming
future generations and jeopardizing the natural
environment through its long-term catastrophic
effects (United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs). The spread of nuclear
weapons and the risk of a nuclear attack has
alarmed the international community. As a
result, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) was established in 1968 to curtail the
spread of nuclear weapons by promoting
cooperation amongst international state actors.
Despite the establishment of the NPT, the last
decade has seen the addition of three new,
publicly acknowledged nuclear states, namely,
India, Pakistan and North Korea (Kreiger 369).
Iran has also publicly expressed high ambitions
to create nuclear power. However, there are
states who have refrained from weaponizing
their nuclear energy such as Saudi Arabia,
Afghanistan, and Palestine. The question then
becomes: why do some states choose to pursue
nuclear weapons and others do not?
In this paper, there will be an emphasis on
why some nations in the Middle East
weaponize their nuclear energy and why others
decide not to. Theories regarding nuclear
proliferation act as a tool to help understand the

motivations behind a state’s decision to acquire
nuclear weapons. A state’s commitment to
proliferation should be seen less as a singular
decision and more as a process that may be
influenced by national security reasons,
domestic political interests, and national
prestige. The comparative methodological
approach will be employed to understand the
significance of nuclear proliferation in Israel,
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The case studies will
begin with a brief history of each state’s
nuclear weapons program and will assess the
motivations for pursuing and maintaining
nuclear weapons. More importantly, the case
studies will focus on how the United States’
presence and interests in the Middle East
caused some Middle Eastern nations to obtain
nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the international
relations theories of Liberalism and
Constructivism will be rejected as the
determining factors of nuclear proliferation.
This paper will argue that Realism and United
States’ interests and alliances are the two
determining factors to explain the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by some countries in the
Middle East.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the creation of the first nuclear bomb
by the United States in the 1940s, strategists
and analysts have sought to explain why some
countries choose to militarize their nuclear
power and why others choose to refrain. The
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conventional view of proliferation is that a
country, at some point, makes an explicit
decision to seek nuclear weapons. Next, the
country launches a secret program and finally
achieves nuclear status by testing a device on
a particular date. In reality, the path to nuclear
weapons capability requires many important
and complex choices along the way (Davidson
20). The complexity of nuclear proliferation
cannot be summarized in one simple
international theory or model. Instead, existing
literature revolves around the three
fundamental international relations schools of
thought with a primary focus on the
perspective of nuclear weapons. Each theory
and framework helps to provide an
explanation of the causes and motivations of
some Middle Eastern nations desire to become
nuclear power states.
The traditionally dominant theory
regarding the motivations for states to pursue
nuclear weapons revolves around the security
model or the international theory of Realism.
Scott Sagan, in his article Why Do States Build
Nuclear Weapons? Three models in search of a
bomb, outlines three theoretical frameworks to
help examine why states decide to build or
refrain from developing nuclear weapons. The
first theoretical framework is called the
Security Model. This model has been the most
supported theory to explain why some nations
choose to create nuclear weapons. The Realist
theory in political science argues that states
exist in an anarchical international system and
must rely on self-help to protect their
sovereignty and national security (Sagan 57).
This is based upon the idea that individuals are
thirsty for power and act in accordance with
their own self-interests. A state will seek to
develop nuclear weapons when faced with a
significant military threat to their security that
cannot be met through alternative means
(Sagan 54). Due to nuclear weapon’s
destructive capabilities, a state that seeks to
maintain national security must balance against
any rival state that develops nuclear weapons

by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent (Sagan
57). Strong states pursue a form of internal
balancing by adopting a policy of developing
their own nuclear weapons, while weak states
join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power
as a means of extended deterrence (Sagan 57).
Overall, Sagan’s theory on the Security Model
argues that states build nuclear weapons to
increase national security against foreign
threats.
Kenneth Waltz, in his book Theory of
International Politics, argues that nuclear
power states are concerned with maintaining
their position within the international system.
States work harder to increase their strength, or
combine with others, if they are falling behind
(Waltz 127). Waltz places high importance on
the structure of the international system. He
states that the distinction between international
and national realms of politics is not found in
the use or the nonuse of force, but in their
different structure (Waltz 104). Since the
structure of the international system is one
centered around the idea of self - help, security
subordinates economic gain to political interest
(Waltz 107). In fact, the structure of the
international system forces states to become
self-reliant and power seekers. By creating
nuclear weapons, that state becomes less reliant
on others. Additionally, the acquisition of
nuclear capability is a potent technique to
prevent the rise of nuclear competition amongst
surrounding nations. Waltz highlights that
weaker states will create an alliance with
stronger nuclear power states as a form of
protection. Nuclear weapons act as an
instrument by dominant states to safeguard and
legitimize their status in the international
community. More importantly, the acquisition
of nuclear weapons was designed for nuclear
power states to maintain their control over
nuclear weapon supplies by preventing and
eliminating competition.
On a similar note, in The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Kenneth Waltz
argues that the growth of nuclear membership
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will contribute to a safer world. He also states
that despite nuclear proliferation efforts,
nuclear weapons will continue to spread. Waltz
claims that each state has a responsibility to
protect themselves by establishing a form of
security, that can be done by incorporating
either the defensive ideal or deterrence theory.
If war were to occur between two nuclear
states, the fear of imminent escalation will
prevent these states from attacking due to the
uncertain realization of annihilation or survival
(Waltz 9). Furthermore, he uses a Realist
perspective saying that possession of nuclear
weapons may slow arms races down, rather
than speed them up. Additionally, lessdeveloped governments do not have the
monetary means nor intellectual knowledge to
formulate nuclear weapons. Lastly, highly
unstable regimes are unlikely to initiate nuclear
projects due to domestic political turmoil
(Waltz 11). The spread of nuclear weapons will
enhance a states’ national security. This is all
to say that the gradual spread of nuclear
weapons should be more welcomed than feared
(Waltz 45).
John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics, argues that greatpower rivalry is still present in the international
system, which contributes to a dangerous
security competition between powerful nations.
Great powers are always searching for
opportunities to gain power over their rivals,
with hegemony as their final goal
(Mearsheimer 29). Mearsheimer emphasizes
that the principle goal for great powers is to
achieve regional hegemony. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons is one- way great power states
can maintain their security in an archaic
international system as well as reach regional
hegemony. Power states regard each other with
suspicion and fear. The basis of this fear is that
in a world where great powers have the
capability to attack each other, any state bent
on survival must at least be suspicious of other
states and reluctant to trust them (Mearsheimer
32). The consequences of falling victim to a

possible attack by another powerful state
further emphasizes the importance of being
fearful of other nations. Political competition
among states is a much more dangerous
business than economic intercourse, because in
extreme cases, war can lead to the destruction
of states (Mearsheimer 33). Mearsheimer
emphasizes that states in the international
system aim to assure their security and
survival. More specifically, each state tends to
see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore
it aims to provide for its own survival
(Mearsheimer 33). Additionally, Mearsheimer
mentions that states look for an opportunity to
alter the balance of power. States employ a
variety of means to shift the balance of power
in their favor, even if doing so makes other
states suspicious or even hostile (Mearsheimer
34). By acquiring nuclear weapons, a state has
the ability to change the balance of power and
increase their own security while threatening
the security of surrounding nations.
The origins of Liberal theory have roots in
the eighteenth- century period of
enlightenment. Liberalism holds that human
nature is basically good and that people can
improve their moral and material conditions
(Mingst 83). More specifically, understanding
laws allow people to improve their condition in
society. Additionally, Liberalism views war as
a result of inadequate institutions and
misunderstanding between world leaders.
Liberals are strong proponents of democracies
and cooperation amongst state leaders.
According to Liberal thinking, the expansion of
human freedom is best achieved in
democracies and through well-regulated market
capitalism (Mingst 83).
Scott Sagan proposes a second model of
nuclear proliferation that focuses on domestic
actors who encourage or discourage
governments from pursuing the bomb (Sagan
63). In his article Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons? Three models in search of a bomb,
Sagan introduces the Domestic Politics Model
to help explain nuclear proliferation. The
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Domestic Politics model is similar to the
international theory of Liberalism. Liberals
believe that injustice, war, and aggression are
not inevitable but can be moderated through
institutional agencies and cooperative measures
(Mingst 83). Because individuals are rational
beings who have the ability to improve their
social conditions, an unjust society is thus
formed as a result of unjust government
institutions. Adherents to the Domestic Politics
Model argue that the decision to acquire
nuclear weapons is based upon bureaucratic
interests and parochial priorities. Additionally,
domestic leaders create the conditions that
favor weapons acquisition by encouraging
extreme perceptions of foreign threats,
promoting supportive politicians, and actively
lobbying for increased defense spending
(Sagan 64). In fact, initial ideas for the
development of nuclear weapons is caused by
the formation of domestic coalitions within the
scientific-military-industrial complex that favor
weaponization due to the influx of money and
prestige flowing into the laboratories (Sagan
64). In order to gain political and social
support, scientific domestic coalitions persuade
politicians within the executive and legislative
branches to shape social perceptions regarding
the benefits of nuclear weapons. The Domestic
Politics Model views international security
threats as being more malleable and merely as
windows of opportunity through which
parochial interests can jump (Sagan 65).
Robert Betts, in his article Paranoids,
Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation,
explains how the domestic political structure of
a state has the ability to exert influence on the
decision - making process regarding nuclear
weapons. Betts argues that national security
and status are the two fundamental motives to a
nation acquiring nuclear weapons. However, he
highlights the pivotal role that domestic
political leaders have in the creation of nuclear
weapons by analyzing Pygmy States, Paranoid
States, and Pariah States. Pygmy States are
concerned with national security and strongly

believe that nuclear weapons can act as a
powerful deterrent tool as well as a “tactical
application against forces concentrated for land
breakthroughs and amphibious landings” (Betts
166). Paranoid States are concerned with
national security however, this paranoia can
make them believe in an unrealistic security
threat. Lastly, Betts argues that Pariah States
have the concerns of both Pygmy and Paranoid
States, therefore being the most dangerous
nations. Pariah States tend to have paranoid
attitudes towards the international community
thereby having the clearest incentives to
increase their military power (Betts 167). This
paranoid attitude is commonly recognized in an
authoritarian regime where political power is
centralized in one ruling force. Because there is
minimal political mobilization in Pariah States,
domestic political leaders hold a tremendous
amount of influence in the nations’ military
decision.
Scott Sagan introduces a third model that
can help explain why some states choose
nuclear weapons acquisition. This model
focuses on non-material factors such as status
and prestige. According to the Norms Model,
state behavior is determined not by leaders’
cold calculations regarding national security
interests or their parochial bureaucratic
interests, but rather spearheaded by deeper
norms and shared beliefs about what actions
are legitimate and appropriate in international
relations (Sagan 73). Within the realm of
Sociology, new institutionalism refers to
modern organizations and institutions coming
to resemble each other not because of
competition or rational learning but because
institutions mimic each other (Sagan 74). New
institutionalism emphasizes the importance of
the roles, routines, and rituals of individuals
and organizations. Such interests are shaped by
the social roles actors are asked to play and
thus are embedded in a social environment that
promotes certain structures and behaviors as
rational and legitimate and others as irrational
and primitive (Sagan 74). Nuclear weapons are
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viewed as a tool of modern society where states
believe that they must possess them in order to
look legitimate to surrounding states and the
international community. Although the
establishment of nuclear weapons may not be
logical or cost efficient for some states, it is a
symbol of modernity that possesses an
abundance of power.
The international relations theory of
Constructivism is similar to the Norms Model.
It focuses on the power of ideas, norms, values
and principles of a particular state in the
embracement or refrainment of nuclear
proliferation. Domestic political actors shape
and influence a states’ decision in becoming a
nuclear power state. According to political
scientists, literature regarding the development
and escalation of nuclear weapons is a result of
norms within the international community. The
norms perspective emphasizes the importance
of power and coercion in influencing states to
see the value of acquiring nuclear weapons. In
fact, normative pressures may begin with the
actions of entrepreneurial non-state actors, but
their beliefs only have a significant influence
once powerful state actors join the cause
(Sagan, 75). Similarly, normative beliefs
regarding nuclear weapons contributed to the
creation of legal restrictions that prohibited
their use during war. Additionally, nations who
possess nuclear weapons use them as a fear
tactic to deter other nations from acquiring
nuclear armaments.
CASE STUIDES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. ISRAEL
Established in 1948, the state of Israel can
be classified as a success story. A transition
from Holocaust to revival, Israel has become
the region’s most formidable military power
by turning a small, service economy into one
of the world’s greatest centers for
technological innovation (Cohen). Despite
Israel’s success as a nation, it continues to be
haunted by its past and the country’s survival

is constantly at stake. Israel’s survival as a
civilization surrounded by a hostile and
populous Muslim world has contributed to an
inner feeling of absolute fragility (Cohen).
Israel viewed the establishment of nuclear
weapons as a fundamental and critical
necessity in order to preserve their security as
a nation. In fact, nuclear weapons were seen
as an important element of military power.
The fear of a military attack by a hostile
Arabian nation, it’s geographic location and
the security protection of a major power such
as the United States, were all contributing
factors that led to Israel becoming a nuclear
weapon state.
Israel’s nuclear weapons program was
conducted in secrecy with the help of France
during the mid 1950s. Israel and France
formed a cooperative relationship due to
shared commercial and strategic interests in
the formation of nuclear weapons. At the time,
both France and Israel viewed this as an
opportunity to maintain a degree of autonomy
in foreign policy in the bipolar environment of
the Cold War (Bahgat 91). Additionally, by
helping Israel produce nuclear weapons, it
helped France’s nuclear industry establish
credibility in the international community.
More importantly, what created such a
powerful alliance between these two nations
was a common enemy, Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein. In 1956,
Hussein nationalized the Suez Canal that was
controlled by France and Britain. Due to this,
the United States and Britain agreed to stop
financing the construction of Egypt’s Aswan
High Dam. This led to the “Suez Crisis”
where Nasser declared martial law in the canal
zone, seizing all operations of the Suez Canal
Company (The Suez Crisis, Britannica). Israel
decided to invade the canal while British and
French troops withdrew. The Suez Crisis
ended with Egypt being the victor contributing
to more aggression towards Nasser by the
French and the Israelis. For these reasons,
France helped Israel achieve nuclearization.
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The primary reason as to why Israel chose
to nuclearize was due to national security,
more specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors
began after the birth of the nation in 1948. The
conflict involves issues relating to ethnic and
religious differences as well as disputes over
territorial claims and national integrity
(Bickerton 18). Essentially, the struggle is
between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews
over territory that each nation claims is theirs.
For Israel, the most important issue is that of
national security. In 2006, the terrorist
organization Hezbollah, launched an attack
against Israel in order to pressure the country
into releasing Lebanese prisoners. The war
ended after thirty-four days and left over a
thousand of Lebanese dead or displaced
(Arab- Israel Wars, Britannica). Additionally,
Israel’s geographical location and close
proximity to Palestine has made them a target
for attacks. With an increase of military
presence on the West Bank, Israel has not only
become immune to the violence but has also
increased conventional military power. Due
to the possibility of being attacked by its Arab
neighbors, Israel’s primary motivation for
establishing nuclear weapons was to enhance
their national security.
The fundamental question that Israel now
faces regarding nuclear weapons is whether
their possession would serve or harm the
nation’s national security (Cohen 34).
The primary reason Israel established nuclear
weapons was for national security reasons
because the bomb acts as a deterrence for
other nations. Israel established a unique style
of proliferation and a code of nuclear conduct
that set it apart from other nuclear-weapons
states (Cohen 35). Israel adopted an amimut
bargain where the nation does not
acknowledge its possession of the bomb
despite the international community being
aware that it does. Secrecy and nonacknowledgement became the key ingredients
for Israel’s amimut bargain with nuclear

proliferation. In order for amimut to work,
there should be enough credible evidence to
deter enemies, but sufficient ambiguity and
lack of acknowledgement to allow friends to
look the other way (Cohen 46). Firm
knowledge that Israel has a nuclear arsenal
much larger than needed would encourage
Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons
(Barnaby 46). Mutual nuclear deterrence
would destabilize the Middle East, so by
adopting the amimut bargain, Israel created a
code of conduct by not recognizing itself as a
nuclear weapon state. However, Israel was in
favor of an effective Non Proliferation Treaty
as a nuclear-weapons state, but as long as it
faced existential threats, it was not willing to
relinquish it (Cohen 40). Although national
security was the primary force that
spearheaded Israel’s decision to become a
nuclear weapons state, United States toleration
of Israel becoming a nuclear superpower was
a secondary factor to the nation’s success in
proliferation.
Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive
U.S. Presidents and many Members of
Congress have demonstrated a commitment to
Israel’s security and to a close U.S. - Israel
cooperation (Zanotti). More importantly, the
United States became tolerant of Israel’s
nuclear weapons program because the two
nations share common democratic values,
economic partnerships, and security interests.
Over time, U.S. -Israeli relations have evolved
to incorporate legislation, bilateral
agreements, and trade (Zanotti 1).
The United States was willing to tolerate
Israel’s nuclear pursuit due to shared
democratic values. In the first decades
following its founding, Israeli society sought
to build a country dedicated to Western liberal
ideas and values (Zanotti 5). The United
States and Israel share the same values of
tolerance, freedom, and democracy to all
persons regardless of race, religion or
ethnicity. Both democratic nations hold the
concept of liberty and freedom to the highest
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regard. Israel’s deep and extensive
commitment to democracy was a result of
their admiration towards American culture and
society. Israel’s government structure and
political system is based upon free and fair
elections, a mirror reflection of the United
States. The U.S. - Israeli relationship was built
upon similar fundamental democratic
principles and values, which contributed to the
United States becoming tolerant of Israeli
nuclear weapons.
A second factor that contributed to the
United States acceptance of Israeli nuclear
proliferation is economic interests. Economic
aid from the United States to Israel began after
Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967.
The Six Day War was a bloody conflict
between Israel and the Arab nations of Syria,
Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s success in the Six
Day War was largely due to its military
strategic planning. By launching preemptive
air strikes and coordinating ground offense
strategies, Israeli victory completely altered
the geographical landscape of the Middle East.
This altercation greatly benefited the United
States and Israel with regards to economic
trade. In 1985, the two nations signed the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), which became the
cornerstone of a vibrant U.S. - Israel economic
relationship (Oren 128). Since then, Israel
became one of the largest trading partners to
the United States. This mutual economic
relationship is primarily due to shared
common values of a free and competitive
market economy. The constant dialogue
between the governments of Israel and the
United States to upgrade their economic
partnership and to ensure continued prosperity
has resulted in a strong alliance between these
two nations (Oren 128).
The most significant factor that led to the
United States acknowledging and accepting
Israel’s nuclear weapons program is largely
due to security interests. Strong bilateral
relations regarding security interests in the
Middle East reinforced U.S. - Israel

relationship regarding military aid, arms sales,
and information sharing (Zanotti 16). More
importantly, the United States helped
transform Israel’s military through money and
information sharing. In fact, Israel has
generally been the largest annual recipient of
U.S. foreign assistance by providing $3 billion
in grants (Zanotti 18). Additionally, Congress
continues to provide hundreds of millions of
dollars in annual assistance beyond
Administration-requested amounts for Israel’s
Iron Dome anti-rocket system and joint U.S. Israel missile defense programs (Zanotti 20).
United States aid was designed to maintain
Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over
neighboring militaries (Zanotti 16). By
helping to reinforce Israel’s national security
through military equipment and monetary aid,
the United States is establishing regional
stability in the Middle East. Due to similar
democratic values and economic interests,
Israel’s national security is of great
importance to the United States. Essentially,
the United States is aware that re-enforcing
Israel’s national security will help in
stabilizing the Middle East. More importantly,
Israel’s national security is of equal benefit to
the United States because it helps decrease
traditional security threats from the
surrounding Arab nations.
Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is
largely influenced by the Realist theory where
gaining nuclear weapons is the only way to
guarantee the nation’s security. In fact,
nuclear weapons were seen as insurance
against the day when Israel loses its
conventional military technological
superiority over the Arabs and needs a
deterrent against an Arab chemical attack
(Barnaby 50). More importantly, a state will
decide to go nuclear depending on the level
and type of security threats that it faces and
the nature of the interactions with its
adversaries and its geo-strategic environment
(Bahgat 8). Additionally, the realist approach
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can be implemented to describe Iran’s nuclear
ambitions.
B. IRAN

For more than two decades, Iran has
aggressively invested time, money and
resources into nuclear weapon capabilities. An
examination into Iran’s motivations to acquire
nuclear weapons requires a close evaluation
on each analytical level. Each analytical level
can offer specific insight into the reasons why
Iran has chosen to proliferate. Taken together,
system, state and individual level motivations
can provide a fairly complete picture of Iran’s
nuclear proliferation process (Mayer 1). Three
factors that largely motivated Iran’s ambition
to acquire nuclear weapons were domestic
political interests, national prestige, and
national security.
Iran’s nuclear energy program was initiated
when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was still
in power. The Shah was determined to create
an ambitious nuclear energy program in order
to help Iran modernize as a nation. With the
expertise of Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Kahn and with the aid of some
nuclear weapon states, Iran embarked on an
impressive scheme to evade export controls on
dual use of technology (Greenblum 62).
Additionally, Western countries like the
United States supported Iran’s quest for
nuclear energy after the country signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970.
This was a period where the Shah enjoyed
good relations with the United States and
other Western countries (Greenblum 61). In
the early stages of developing nuclear energy,
the United States provided support and aid to
Iran’s nuclear energy program. Enriched fuel
was supplied by an American company, AMF,
where Iran agreed to purchase eight reactors
(Bahgat 20). This purchase was used to create
a uranium enrichment plant in order to
generate nuclear energy which in turn had the
potential to generate nuclear weapons. Since
the United States wanted the Shah to rise to
the role of Gulf protectorate, United States

leaders looked the other way during Iran’s
early nuclear foray (Mayer 7).
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution that
overthrew the Shah of Iran, Ayatollah
Khomeini seized power and halted the
country’s nuclear weapons program.
Khomeini strongly believed that nuclear
weapons were a complete contradiction of
what Islam stood for. However, despite
damages to Iran’s nuclear energy facilities by
the United States and the Iraqi government,
Iran restarted its nuclear weapons program in
the 1980s. Iran argued that their development
of nuclear energy is motivated by the desire to
generate electricity and to master the fuel
cycle in order to become a supplier of nuclear
fuel in the future (Chubin 24). Iran’s
acquisition of fuel cycle includes facilities for
plutonium reprocessing and highly enriched
uranium, the two essential components needed
to create nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Iran’s
focus on super-enrichment, its history of
concealment, and its virtually limitless supply
of oil leaves most experts convinced that it is
in fact seeking nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran
strengthened their nuclear energy program by
creating the Atomic Energy Organization
responsible for operating nuclear energy and
nuclear fuel cycle installations. A closer
analysis of Iran’s nuclear weapons program
reveals that the nation chose to proliferate due
domestic political interests, national prestige
and national security issues.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions are shaped by
domestic political interests. Iranian policy is
driven less by a rigid ideological revolutionary
to one that encompasses different national
interests in order to be more receptive to
global norms and rules. Looking at the
individual level of analysis, Iranian leaders are
locked onto particular interests of which they
will be very reluctant to let go (Mayer 4).
These domestic political actors have
persuaded government leaders and societal
elites that nuclear weapons are needed for
political power and military strength. As a
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result, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani began improving economic and
diplomatic relations with other world leaders.
Internal political forces are utilized to
persuade individuals that nuclear weapons
programs are needed and essential for the
nations’ national security, regardless if these
weapons serve the states interest. In this
realm, bureaucratic actors from civilian
scientific institutions, special military units,
and political arms form coalitions strong
enough to control the governmental decisionmaking process, through controlling
information or by direct political power
(Mayer 60). Iran’s nuclear weapons program
was facilitated by active participants that
create conditions which favor proliferation to
counter perceived national security threats
(Mayer 60). Domestic political interests
enticed Iran to expand their nuclear energy
program and to establish nuclear weapons.
Despite the influence of domestic actors in
establishing nuclear weapons, the nuclear
issue is a metaphor for Iran’s quest for greater
respect and a wider regional and global role
(Chubin 28).
A deeper analysis into Iran’s motivations to
acquire nuclear weapons reveals a desire to
gain national prestige. Most Iranians perceive
their nation as a great civilization that has
been deprived of its “rightful” status as a
regional superpower by foreign intervention
from the Russians, the British, and the
Americans (Bahgat 36). This intense feeling
of victimization has strengthened Iran’s desire
to build nuclear weapons. Establishing an
Iranian nuclear weapon facility would
establish respect as well as fear to the
surrounding Arab nations, Israel and the
United States. Driven by popular sentiments,
Iranians insist that they have an “inalienable
right” to produce nuclear fuel and to be selfsufficient in their nuclear program (Bahgat
36). More specifically, Iran has chosen to be
self-dependent in acquiring nuclear weapons
by refusing to ask for aid and assistance from

other nuclear weapon states. The choice to be
self-reliant in creating nuclear weapons was
largely motivated by Iran’s inability to trust
foreign countries, more specifically the United
States. In fact, Iranians accuse the United
States of pursuing a policy of “Selective
Proliferation” that permits some countries to
enrich fuel and others not to (Bahgat 37). This
double standard of “selective proliferation” is
evidently seen through the United States
reaction of discovering Israel’s nuclear
weapons capabilities and later accepting it.
The primary motivating factor for Iran’s
nuclear ambitions is national security issues.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran
would act as a deterrence strategy from
conventional and existential threats by Iraq,
Israel and the United States. The potential
threat from Iraq is the most persuasive reason
for Iran to consider acquiring nuclear deterrent
(Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and
Analysis). Because Iraq is known to have
sought nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons of mass destruction, Iran’s national
security is threatened by the possibility of
such an attack. In fact, Iraq continues to
remain determined in creating nuclear and
chemical capabilities despite the International
community’s condemnation of these actions.
The fear of an Iraqi chemical attack became a
reality in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war when
Iraqi Kurds used chemical weapons against
Iranian troops. International inaction
reinforced Iran’s view that arming themselves
with nuclear weapons will be for defense and
deterrence purposes. The only way to ensure
the nation’s national security and safety is to
acquire the bomb.
Israel is often depicted by Iranians either as
a direct threat or as a state with imperial
motivations (Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options:
Issues and Analysis). More specifically, Iran
views Israel as a regional competitor that was
created by the United States to balance the
power in the Middle East. Despite the current
animosity between Iran and Israel, these two
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nations were not always rivals. It was not until
the defeat of Iraq in 1991 and the United
States military intervention in 2003 that
hostile tension between Iran and Israel
surmounted. To make matters worse, the
differing ideological perspectives and Iran’s
nuclear ambitions only heightened tensions
between these two nations. Additionally, Iran
views Israel as a military and geopolitical rival
due to Israel’s strong relationship with the
United States. With Israel as the only regional
state considering military action against Iran
as its nuclear efforts move forward, the rivalry
between Israel and Iran has emerged as a
defining feature of the current regional
environment (Israel and Iran: A Dangerous
Rivalry). Gaining nuclear weapons will only
help reinforce Iran’s security and decrease
conventional military threats from Israel and
the United States. The ability to acquire
nuclear weapons is strongly motivated by
Iran’s national security as opposed to
domestic political interests and national
prestige. Although national security is one
factor that has contributed to Iran seeking
nuclear weapons, the United States hostile
response is what contributed to their lack of
success.
The United States continues to be
intolerant towards Iran’s motivations to
acquire nuclear weapons. United States
hostility towards Iran’s nuclear ambitions is
largely due to the unstable relationship these
two nations have with each other. More
specifically, the establishment of nuclear
weapons by Iran would threaten United States
interests in the region. U.S. - Iran relations
have been adversarial since the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran where Mohammad Reza
Shah, who was known to have ties to the
United States, was overthrown. Orchestrated
by Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution led to
the establishment of an Islamic republic in
Iran, contributing to even more tension
between these two nations.

Since the 1979 revolution, the United
States has consistently identified Iran’s
support for militant Middle Eastern groups as
a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies
(U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications). Since
2002, the United States has attempted to
constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program
through the implementation of diplomatic
agreements, economic sanctions and military
deployments. In 2015, Iran and the six world
powers met to establish a deal that would limit
Iran’s nuclear program by increasing
surveillance in exchange for uplifting
economic sanctions imposed by the United
States. However, in May 2018, the Trump
Administration withdrew the United States
from the 2015 nuclear agreement, formally
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) (U.S.-Iran Tensions and
Implications). The Trump Administration
argued that the agreement did not address the
broad range of U.S. concerns about Iranian
behavior and would not permanently preclude
Iran from developing nuclear weapons (U.S.Iran Tensions and Implications). As a result,
the United States turned to economic and
military pressure in order to deter Iran from
advancing their nuclear weapons program.
Ever since the Trump Administration
withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran in
2018, the administration has pursued a policy
of Maximum Pressure in the hopes of
negotiating a better agreement with Iran. The
policy of Maximum Pressure includes
economic sanctions and military action by
United States Armed Forces. For example, in
May 2019, the Trump Administration ended a
U.S. sanctions exception for any country
purchasing Iranian oil (U.S.-Iran Tensions and
Implications). This course of action was taken
to drive Iranian oil exports down, thus dealing
a devastating blow to their economy.
Additionally, the United States ended waivers
under the Iran Freedom and CounterProliferation Act, that allowed countries to
help Iran remain within stockpile limits (U.S.-
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Iran Tensions and Implications). The Trump
Administration responded militarily by
planning to deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln
Carrier Strike Group to the region and sending
a bomber task force to the Persian Gulf in the
hopes of cultivating fear amongst the Iranian
government (U.S.-Iran Tensions and
Implications). Unfortunately, this tactic by the
Trump Administration was unsuccessful. The
Administration responded by allocating
immediate foreign military sales exceeding
over $8 billion to Saudi Arabia in an effort to
“deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf
and throughout the Middle East” (U.S.-Iran
Tensions and Implications).
Despite the Trump Administrations
Maximum Pressure policy efforts, Iran
responded by demonstrating its ability to harm
global commerce and United States interests
while raising concerns regarding nuclear
activities. In June 2019, Iran shot down an
unmanned aerial surveillance aircraft,
claiming that it had entered Iranian airspace
over the Gulf of Oman (U.S.-Iran Tensions
and Implications). The downing of the
American drone was a clear message to the
United States that Iran will defend its borders
against any foreign aggressor. Iran’s
retaliation against the United States economic
sanctions and military deployment efforts did
not stop there. In September 2019, Iran
launched a large and sophisticated attack on
Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated
that Iran has now launched an unprecedented
attack on the world’s energy supply (U.S.-Iran
Tensions and Implications). As a result, the
attack contributed to a significant portion of
the Saudi oil fields being shut down. The
attack on the Saudi oil field primarily
devastated United States interest with oil.
Despite United States efforts to punish Iran’s
decades-long history of destructive tactics and
nuclear ambitions, their efforts have only
contributed to more hostility between the two
nations. This hostility further exceeds Iran’s

ambitions to nuclearize and become a nuclear
weapon state to defend itself from the United
States and its allies. Iran’s efforts to nuclearize
is primarily due to national security reasons as
well as the intense feeling of victimization it
has towards the United States.
C. SAUDI ARABIA

Very little attention is given to Saudi
Arabia’s capabilities to create nuclear
weapons in the Middle East. Being the third
giant state on the Persian Gulf, the question
must be asked: Is Saudi Arabia seeking
nuclear weapons capability? No concrete
evidence has been found to suggest Saudi
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Although
Saudi Arabia has the financial capability to
create nuclear weapons, the nation does not
experience a severe national security threat
unlike Israel and Iran. More importantly, close
security cooperation with the United States
has left Saudi Arabia with little incentive to
acquire nuclear weapons (Bahgat 65). Even
more so, the United States commitment to the
survival of the Saudi regime and the country’s
territorial integrity has contributed to no
security threats and is the best guarantee that
the nation will not seek nuclear weapons
(Bahgat 66). Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic
placement and close alliance with the United
States are the two significant factors to help
explain why such a wealthy nation has chosen
nuclear restraint.
Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic characteristics
has significantly shaped the nation’s security
environment. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is
the largest and most powerful state in the
Arabian Peninsula as well as an important
actor in oil affairs (Peterson 7). Saudi Arabia
has the smallest population in comparison to
its rivals in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s
national security was of major concern during
the Cold War when the Soviet Union
pressured the nation to become Communist.
The Soviet Union and surrounding Arab
nationalist regimes presented a major security
threat to the survival of the nation.
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Additionally, like most of the Arab nations,
the Saudis resented the establishment of the
Israeli nation. In an effort to create peace, a
meeting took place between U.S. President
Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Saud ibn
Abd al-Aziz where two agreements were
established. Despite this agreement between
the two nations, Saudi Arabia continued to
view Israel as a contributor to the high
instability in the Middle East. But, instead of
relying on the Soviet Union in the struggle
against Israel, Saudi Arabia sought the help
and alliance of western countries, particularly
the United States, to exert pressure on the
Jewish state (Bahgat 69). A comprehensive
solution to regain back stability in the region
can only be accomplished if Israel gives back
Arab territories that was acquired after the Six
Day War. Over time, Saudi Arabia has joined
United States peace negotiations with Israel in
an effort to decrease hostility between the two
nations. Although Saudi Arabia blamed the
creation of Israel for the instability in the
Middle East, it never planned to confront
Israel with a conventional or unconventional
military attack. This is all to say, due to Saudi
Arabia's geostrategic location, the nation did
not gain any hostile enemies, therefore not
having any security reasons to establish
nuclear weapons.
The nature of the relationship between
Saudi Arabia and Iran did not contribute to
any national security risks for either country.
In fact, both nations share important
similarities such as foreign policy
orientations, Islam, oil, regional security and
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has shaped
their relationship. Iran and Saudi Arabia share
similar foreign policy and security orientations
primarily throughout the Cold War. Both
nations sought to contain and resist the spread
of Communism to their country. Despite their
close relationship in containing communism,
Saudi Arabia continued to act suspiciously
towards the Shah of Iran. As a result, Saudi
Arabia viewed its alliance with the United

States as an important factor for the nations’
security. To demonstrate the nation’s
commitment to nuclear restraint, Saudi Arabia
signed a memorandum of understanding on
Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation in 2008
(Squassoni, 8). No credible evidence suggests
that Saudi Arabia has ever pursued nuclear
weapons or has the ambition to do so. Shortly
thereafter the signing of the Civil Nuclear
Energy Cooperation, the U.S. Department of
State released a statement stating, “Saudi
Arabia has stated its intent to rely on
international markets for nuclear fuel and to
not pursue sensitive nuclear technologies”
(Squassoni, 8). Additionally, being a nonnuclear state member of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, Saudi Arabia has
welcomed comprehensive safeguards in order
to further the objective of a weapons free
zone. Because Saudi Arabia does not suffer
any security threats, the acquisition of nuclear
weapons is not needed to deter potential
attackers.
One factor as to why Saudi Arabia
continues to be a non-nuclear weapon state is
its close alliance with the United States. For
more than seven decades, Saudi Arabia’s
relationship with the United States centered
around trade, technical cooperation and
military and civilian contracts (Safran, 210).
More specifically, these interests centered
around oil supplies, security and the
containment of militant Islam. Unlike Israel
and the United States who share similar
democratic values, the United States
relationship with Saudi Arabia is
predominantly shaped by economic and
security interests for both countries. Saudi
Arabia is the second leading source of
imported oil to the United States, providing
just under one million barrels per day of oil to
the U.S market (U.S. Relations with Saudi
Arabia). In fact, Saudi trade with the United
States grew tremendously from $2.6 billion in
1974 to $10.2 billion in 1978 (Safran, 215).
Saudi Arabia’s ability to quickly ramp up oil
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production has made the United States
dependent on Saudi oil. However, an Iranian
nuclear weapons program would trigger Saudi
Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons of their
own. Bruce Riedel of the Brookings
Institution suggested in 2016 that Saudi
Arabia is less concerned about Iranian nuclear
weapons that Iran’s quest for regional
hegemony because it believes it is covered by
the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Squassoni, 12). As
a result, Saudi Arabia benefits from the United
States nuclear umbrella, a guarantee that the
nation will prevent and defend Saudi Arabia
from any potential nuclear attacks.
A second factor which led to a strong
alliance between the United States and Saudi
Arabia is largely due to security reasons. After
the September 11 attacks, President Bush
informed the world that “either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists (Bahgat 80).
Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the
terrorists’ attacks and supported the United
States position to go to war. The Bush
Administration was content with Saudi efforts
in cooperation with the War on Terror. This
mutual alliance regarding security only
strengthened the United States - Saudi
relationship. The unofficial alliance between
the United States and Saudi Arabia is likely to
endure for decades to come. Allying with the
United States has contributed significantly to
an increase in Saudi security within the
region. Saudi oil has greatly benefited the
United States. Additionally, heightened
military action by the United States has
contributed significantly to advancing Saudi
Arabia’s national security. The extensive
economic and military ties between Riyadh
and Washington offers no reason as to why
Saudi Arabia should acquire nuclear weapons.
Since Saudi Arabia benefits greatly from an
economic and military relationship with the
United States, by creating nuclear weapons,
this mutually beneficial relationship will
tremendously impact the security and the
economy of Saudi Arabia. More importantly,

the American -Saudi alliance is built on shared
interests, not common values. Despite
growing security uncertainties in the Middle
East, Saudi Arabia should not be considered a
serious nuclear proliferation threat (Bahgat
86).
THE DETERMINING FACTORS TO NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION

National security and United States
interests are the two determining factors
regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East. The Security Model is one theoretical
framework that provides insight into the
motivations of nuclear acquisition by Israel
and Iran. The security model, similar to the
international theory of Realism, argues that
states will seek to develop nuclear weapons
when they face a significant military threat to
their security that cannot be met through
alternative means (Sagan 54). Israel chose to
proliferate due to national security reasons.
Specifically, the Arab-Israeli conflict in the
Persian Gulf motivated Israel to seek nuclear
capabilities. The creation of the Jewish state
after World War II and the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by Israel significantly altered
the balance of power in the region. The
possibility of a nuclear attack by Israel
contributed to Iran’s quest for nuclear
weapons. Additionally, Iran viewed the United
States military involvement as a threat to the
states’ sovereignty and national security. After
funding both sides of the Iran-Iraq War, the
United States intervened when Iraq invaded
Kuwait resulting in the 1991 Gulf War. After
the September 11 attacks, the Bush
Administration invaded Afghanistan in hopes
of capturing Osama Bin Laden. Two years
later, the United States intervened in Iraq
because American intelligence believed
Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction. Iraq’s ambition to attain nuclear
weapons capabilities was an additional threat
to Iran’s national security. Ongoing American
military presence in the Middle East left Iran
feeling vulnerable and powerless, which
13
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increased their interest in gaining nuclear
weapons for security purposes.
According to Realist theory, every time
one state develops nuclear weapons to balance
against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear
threat to another state in the region (Sagan 58).
Saudi Arabia’s commitment to refrain from
developing nuclear weapons can be explained
by the security model. Saudi Arabia is a
wealthy nation that has the capability to
acquire nuclear weapons. However, Saudi
Arabia does not have the incentive to
proliferate because the nation does not have a
significant security threat. Despite Israel’s
creation of nuclear weapons and Iran’s
aspiration to proliferate, these two nations are
not a security threat to Saudi Arabia.
A secondary factor that helps to explain
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is
United States’ interests. Israel and Saudi
Arabia share a mutually beneficial partnership
with the United States. Because of this, Saudi
Arabia is protected under the United States
nuclear umbrella. United States interests in
providing military aid to Israel and Saudi
Arabia will contribute to stabilization and the
balance of power in the Middle East. United
States alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia
are motivated by the ability to dominate and
control foreign policy efforts in the region. By
having the United States as a close ally, Israel
and Saudi Arabia benefit from economic and
military aid that strengthens each nations’
national security. The United States is highly
invested in maintaining the close relationship
that it has with Israel and Saudi Arabia because
of its ability to maintain the balance of power
in the Middle East. In contrast, Iran does not
share in a mutually beneficial alliance with the
United States, primarily due to U.S. military
involvement in the region. Ever since the 1979
Iranian revolution that overthrew the Shah, the
United States relationship with Iran has been
hostile. Tension escalated between these two
nations after the United States discovered Iran
revamped its nuclear weapons program for

national security purposes. An Iranian nuclear
weapons program would be a threat to the
United States and United States interests. More
specifically, nuclear weapons in the hands of
an Iranian regime would endanger Israel’s
security and destabilize the balance of power in
the region.
CONCLUSION

The proliferation of nuclear weapons
states in the Middle East poses a significant
threat to United States’ interests, international
security and the stability of the region. Efforts
by the international community to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons, especially by rogue
regimes, have been conducted through
diplomatic negotiations and military
intervention. In order to contain the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United
States has expanded its security presence by
forming alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia
to maintain the balance of power in the Middle
East. Longstanding security alliance between
the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia has
helped the U.S. contain certain rogue regimes
from acquiring nuclear weapons. The two
determining factors to explain nuclear
proliferation and nuclear restrain in the Middle
East are national security and United States
interests and alliances.
The foreign policy theories of Liberalism
and Constructivism fail to answer a critical
question: why do some states choose to acquire
nuclear weapons and others choose not to?
Although domestic political interests and
national prestige are two factors that can
explain Iran’s motivations to acquire nuclear
weapons, national security was the overarching
reason why this nation wants weapons.
Similarly, national security was the primary
force that spearheaded Israel’s decision to
become a nuclear weapon state due to its
strategic geographical location. Saudi Arabia
has little incentive to build nuclear weapons
capabilities largely because the nation does not
face a direct security threat. Nuclear
proliferation in Israel and Iran’s ambition to
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acquire nuclear weapons aligns significantly
with the realist perspective and the Security
Model outlined by Scott Sagan. A state will
seek to develop nuclear weapons when faced
with a significant military or security threat
(Sagan 54).
The United States has been and continues to
be a powerful actor in international foreign
policy. The U.S. interests and alliances with a
nation dominates international foreign policy
and is a second factor in explaining nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East. Due to shared
democratic values, economic and military
interests, the United States was tolerant
towards Israel’s nuclear weapons program.
Additionally, the United States continues to
provide military assistance in the form of
weapons, monetary aid, and military
knowledge in order to help Israel’s national
security. The U.S. is invested in Israel’s
national security because the Israeli military
has prevented radical nationalist movements
that would alter regional stability and security
in the region. A similar comparison is drawn to
Saudi Arabia’s decision to refrain from
acquiring nuclear weapons. Because the
nations do not have a perceived security threat,
acquiring nuclear weapons would be more
costly than helpful. Additionally, Saudi Arabia
continues to enjoy and benefit from United
States economic and security resources.
Therefore, if Saudi Arabia was to initiate a
nuclear weapons program, it would negatively
impact the nation’s relationship with the United
States. Since Saudi Arabia has continued to
refrain from creating nuclear weapons, despite
the resources and monetary means to create a
program, the nation continues to benefit from
the protection of the United States nuclear
umbrella. On the other hand, Iran’s hostile
relationship with the United States has posed
severe security issues for the nation, thereby
seeking nuclear weapons as a tool for security
and deterrence. Overall, the United States will
continue to be a dominant force in international
relations and foreign policy. The findings of

this thesis conclude that national security and
United States’ interests and alliances are the
two determining factors to explain why some
nations in the Middle East choose to pursue
nuclear weapons and why others have not.
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